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Justice in Time
Robert Hockett*
Abstract
Challenges raised by the subject of intergenerational justice seem often to
be thought almost uniquely intractable.  In particular, apparent conflicts be-
tween the core values of impartiality and efficiency raised by a large and still
growing number of intertemporal impossibility results derived by Koopmans,
Diamond, Basu and Mitra, and others have been taken to foreclose fruitful
policy assessment done with a view to the distant future.
This Essay aims to dispel the sense of bewilderment, pessimism, and at-
tendant paralysis that afflicts intertemporal justice assessment.  It works to-
ward that end by demonstrating that the most vexing puzzles raised by
questions of intergenerational justice afflict only one family of justice theories,
a family whose members never were coherent to begin with.  By contrast, it
argues, the correct approach to justice is no more challenged by transtemporal
puzzles than is any other exercise in future planning.
The Essay proceeds first by showing that puzzles concerning intergenera-
tional—or what it also calls “intertemporal,” “transtemporal,” or
“diachronic”—justice can be helpfully divided into two classes.  One such
class the Essay calls “epistemic.”  The other it calls “analytic.”  The epistemic
puzzles are those occasioned by uncertainties endemic to all contemplation of
future contingencies, not simply our justice assessments thereof.
The analytic puzzles, by contrast, afflict only one family of justice con-
ceptions—those that erroneously take maximizing (“efficiency”) imperatives
to be logically independent of distributive imperatives.  The analytic puzzles
afflict these conceptions, moreover, irrespective of whether the latter be ap-
plied synchronically or diachronically.  The supposed intractability of in-
tergenerational justice, that is to say, is in fact nothing more than an
incoherence afflicting that mistaken understanding of justice which currently
predominates in intertemporal distributive-ethical inquiry.
The Essay next shows that all of the notorious intertemporal impossibility
results from Koopmans’s on down afflict only the erroneous justice concep-
tions just mentioned.  Indeed, like all of the other best known impossibility
results from Arrow’s on down, the intertemporal results are no more than in-
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stances of a more general incoherence—an incoherence the Author has shown
elsewhere to afflict all putatively independent maximizing imperatives mis-
taken for justice conceptions.
The Essay concludes by showing that the correct, analytically coherent
take on justice faces little more challenge from the diachronic than from the
synchronic case.  In both cases, it demonstrates, the correct account of justice
offers straightforward guidance to all who would act in a pragmatic spirit to
work justice among persons across space and through time.
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I. Introduction
Good afternoon and thanks to you all.  I would like first to ex-
press gratitude to Professor Buchanan, Dean Lawrence, The George
Washington University Law School and Law Review, Jackie
Lasaracina and the other student organizers, and my fellow partici-
pants for making the next two days’ colloquy possible.  I mean more
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than a pun in saying that it would be difficult to imagine a more timely
subject upon which to work here together this week.  It would also be
difficult to imagine a subject more apt to render us worthy of thanks,
well into the future, for having undertaken to treat seriously now.
Now I do not say these things merely to flatter us.  I say them
because for the next couple of days we shall be generalizing outward
from some already very “big” topics widely appreciated as urgent:
One such topic, for example, is that of global climate change, along
with its likely effects upon those who will follow us here on this
planet—a topic that figures into much of Doug Kysar’s work.1  An-
other such topic is that of our quickly ballooning national debt, and
how much or how little its servicing will limit the freedom of those
who come later—a topic that figures in some of Neil Buchanan’s
work.2  And of course there are many such topics more specifically
rooted in the particulars of our legal order, including both constitu-
tional ones of the sort that Mike Dorf will be addressing tomorrow,
and the often posed choice between retrospective damages and pro-
spective injunctive relief that I recall routinely to have come up in the
Section 1983 civil rights cases I dealt with first as a law student, then as
an appellate court clerk.
The obvious import of these and other “hot topics” would seem
to carry quite quickly over to that larger class of actions we take that
affect future others—others who cannot, notwithstanding their future
interests in the matter, voice any concerns to us.  Our subject for dis-
cussion over the next couple of days, then, though not yet widely dis-
cussed, is in urgent need of much careful discussion.
Now the actual title of our conference, you will have noticed,
takes the form of a question.  It is: What Does Our Legal System Owe
Future Generations?  That query can be read in a number of ways.  I
shall read it in one way that seems to me plausible, then address my
remarks to that take on the question.  My read on the question is this:
what are we, who live now, obligated to do through our law and pol-
icy, on behalf of such beneficiaries as do not live now, but will likely
be living in future?3
1 We are of course fortunate to have my erstwhile colleague, Doug Kysar, here to say
more on that.
2 More on this will be presented in Neil Buchanan’s presentation. See Neil H. Buchanan,
Four out of Four Panelists Agree: U.S. Fiscal Policy Does Not Cheat Future Generations, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1402 (2009); see also Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHAL-
LENGE 36 (2009); Robert Hockett, A Fixer Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2010).
3 Please leave open the possibility that those “beneficiaries” to whom I refer here include
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On this rendition, our question is “meta-legally” normative in
character.  It is a question concerning how we “ought” to design or
improve our law and policy, in light of whatever it is that we ethically
owe those who are not yet here.  I think that this means that our ques-
tion at bottom is deeply ethical in character.  It is about what we owe
to others.  We are asking what we ought to do, in our shared capacity
as stewards or “co-owners” of a body of law and a legal system, in
light of such obligations as we might individually or collectively owe
those yet to come.4
Now in that light note that this, our conference’s first panel, is for
its part not only ethical, but ethically foundational in character.  It
concerns those “first principles” apt to be implicated by all of the ethi-
cally salient inquiries that we shall be conducting in the next couple of
days.  For our panel is devoted to what its title calls Philosophical Per-
spectives on Intergenerational Justice.  And our panel’s subtitle here
strikes me as especially helpful in indicating what we are called on to
do in this connection, given my own generally “grammatical” take on
the subject of distributive ethics, or justice.5  For the subtitle asks,
Who, What, How, and Why?  And in my estimation, all fully determi-
nate specifications of positions one might take in respect of distribu-
tive-ethical questions have to address precisely these, as well as a few
cognate questions.6
But I anticipate, so more on this “grammar” business a bit further
below.  For the moment let me say simply that I have come to believe,
and shall presently argue, that attending carefully to the “Who,”
“What,” and “How” questions raised by our panel’s subtitle offers us
very good reason to hope we might actually manage to do justice to
future generations as well as to those presently living.  And that is
significant not only for ethical reasons.  It is significant for context-
specific disciplinary reasons as well: For much of the justice inquiry,
and nearly all of the intergenerational justice inquiry conducted over
more than human beings.  If, as we might, we owe obligations to nonhuman animals and perhaps
other living—even nonliving?—things, then these too will be among the “beneficiaries” here.
See infra Part III.B.
4 “Or” here to be taken in the inclusive sense—“a, b, . . ., n, or some combination
thereof.”
5 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory of Justice,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Deep Grammar]; Robert Hockett, Tak-
ing Distribution Seriously, 59 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Hockett, Taking Dis-
tribution Seriously]; see also infra Parts II and III.
6 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5, at 1210 n.85 (“I classify questions according
as they pertain to what is distributed, to whom it is distributed, and how it is distributed.”).
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the past fifty years or so, has, in my estimation, found itself unnecessa-
rily stultified precisely by failure to take seriously—or even so much
as to address—precisely those critical questions raised by our panel’s
subtitle.  Or so, at any rate, I shall argue.
Here then is how I will proceed.  First, for expository purposes I
shall partition the class of “hard questions” that typically come up in
connection with inquiry about intergenerational—or what I shall also
call “intertemporal,” “transtemporal,” or “diachronic”—distributive
ethics.  Then I shall argue that one of the resultant subclasses of ques-
tion, which I shall call “epistemic,” afflicts all contemplation of and
planning for the future, not merely distributive-ethical contemplation
of and planning for the future.  The other such subclass, which I shall
call “analytic,” by contrast afflicts only one style of distributive-ethical
theorizing—a style, alas, which has tended to dominate the discourse
on intertemporal justice until now.  Questions of this subclass do not,
on the other hand, afflict another mode of justice theorizing familiar
to nonintertemporal contexts—a mode that I shall show in all events
to be more plausible than that to which I have just alluded.
Finally, I shall argue that attending with care to the “Who,”
“What,” and “How” questions I have mentioned yields very good rea-
sons to favor that second mode of justice theorizing to which I have
alluded and which I think most compelling.  The upshot, in turn, is
that we have excellent means at our disposal for developing a maxi-
mally plausible, temporally invariant conception of justice.  The up-
shot is also, in consequence, that once we arrive at this proper
conception of justice, the intergenerational case affords no special
problems apart from those known to afflict all forms of planning—all
forms of decisionmaking oriented toward a distant and accordingly
uncertain future.
The currently troubled state of that subdiscipline of welfare eco-
nomic and justice theory known as “the theory of intergenerational
justice,” in other words, is almost entirely attributable to the domi-
nance of an approach to welfare economic and justice questions that
we ought to have seen all along to be incoherent.  I shall therefore
conclude that we can accordingly, on the basis of that more plausible
understanding of distributive ethics I shall specify, proceed confi-
dently in a practical spirit to do justly both by those who now share
the globe with us, and by those who will inherit the globe from us.
1140 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1135
II. Two Kinds of Challenge to Intertemporal Justice
Let me begin, then, with the partition that I have just promised.
Puzzles that afflict intertemporal justice theorizing can both readily,
and helpfully, be divided into two classes.  I shall characterize them
briefly en suite.
A. Epistemic Puzzles
One class of puzzles that afflict intertemporal justice inquiry com-
prises what I shall term “epistemic” puzzles.  These are puzzles occa-
sioned by uncertainties—some of them perhaps full-blown
indeterminacies—that seem to be endemic to all contemplation of fu-
ture contingencies.7  They are not, in other words, limited to forward-
looking contemplation in which we engage with a view to the justice of
future contingent distributions of one sort or another.  Instead they
afflict all forms of planning, precisely inasmuch as such planning is
done partly on the basis of presently unverifiable beliefs about what
will happen later.
Puzzles of this first class, then, are invariant in all forward-look-
ing decisionmaking contexts, and in that sense are unavoidable in
them.  They afflict any planning we do as regards the future, hence
any planning we do at all, since all planning seems by its nature to be
forward-looking.  These puzzles also afflict, a fortiori, any conception
of distributive justice, or indeed any normative view whatever by ref-
erence to which we attempt to elaborate an account of what ought to
be done in respect of future generations.  It is, in short, the “planning”
aspect that occasions the puzzles, not the “justice planning” aspect.
Here are some examples of these, what I am calling “epistemic,”
puzzles: Who or what creatures actually will be around in the future?
What will their numbers be?  What sorts of things will they count as
goods, or as ills?  What resources are they apt to have at their dispo-
sal?  What other circumstances—e.g., climatic or biospheric—of the
sort that might affect answers to those questions, will obtain in the
future?  Will those on whose behalves we are now professing concern
7 Uncertainty is of course an epistemic category, while indeterminacy is a metaphysical
one.  The former is accordingly more salient, in that we would seem to be unavoidably afflicted
by it irrespective of whether the future is, as a metaphysical matter, determined or not.  We shall
presently find some occasion to note, however, that at least one form of bona fide indetermi-
nacy—at any rate, an agent-relative form—afflicts intertemporal justice theorizing.  It is the
form found in the fact that, in asking what we are obligated to do in respect of the future, we
cannot but view certain portions of the future as indeterminate, precisely because what will hap-
pen depends upon our decision about what to do and then doing it.
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all be on earth, or will some, many, or even all among them eventually
inhabit some other heavenly bodies, naturally occurring or
manufactured?
How can we reply to any of these, or a multitude of cognate ques-
tions, with any degree of confidence?  And don’t answers to all of
them ride at least partly on decisions we make now, hence afflicting
the questions themselves with an ineliminable degree of indetermi-
nacy?8  Tough questions all, these admittedly are, but again they are
not limited to justice inquiry.
B. Analytic Puzzles
Now to the other class of puzzles that afflict intertemporal justice
theorizing, which I shall call “analytic.”  Puzzles of this class are more
foundationally justice-conceptual than futurewise-epistemic in charac-
ter.  They accordingly afflict justice theorizing irrespective of its tem-
poral orientation.  They can afflict, that is, either of or both diachronic
and synchronic justice inquiry.  Unlike puzzles of the first class, then,
they are time-wise invariant.
Puzzles falling within this subclass, precisely because they are an-
alytically foundational, tend to be fairly technical in character.  At any
rate, they tend quickly to turn up in technical work, precisely because
work of the kind is intended to attain clarity as to the logical entail-
ments of our value commitments.  Here are some typical examples:
What is the appropriate “tradeoff” between justice and efficiency?9  Is
impartiality compatible with the Strong Pareto criterion?  How about
the Weak Pareto and Pareto Indifference criteria?10  Is any familiar
8 For more on these forms of indeterminacy, see, for example, Robert Hockett, Noncom-
parabilities and Nonstandard Logics, 25 ECON. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931042.
9 I shall argue that this is no puzzle at all, but is nonsense.  Nevertheless, this interrogative
sentence is taken by many theorists to express a bona fide question, so I shall pretend likewise
for the moment.  The additional puzzles I shall name likewise are afflicted by varying degrees of
“pseudo” stature of this sort.
10 Strong Pareto: If at least one person views one state of the world as better than another,
while nobody views it as worse, then “society as a whole” should regard things this way.  Weak
Pareto: If everyone views one state of the world as better than another, then so should “society
as a whole.”  Pareto Indifference: If everyone is indifferent between two states of the world, then
so should “society as a whole” be deemed.  For fuller discussion, see Robert Hockett, Why Pare-
tians Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and Policy, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2009).
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conception of justice or fairness compatible with any rendition of “the
Pareto Principle”?11  How about with “welfare”?12
These questions, which are commonly encountered now in much
of the technical welfare economic, some of the justice-theoretic, and
even a bit of the law and policy literatures, are temporally indifferent:
They make no more, and no less, sense in diachronic contexts than
they do in synchronic contexts, nor are they any more acute or resolu-
ble in one of those contexts than in the other.  They have equal appli-
cation or nonapplication across time and space alike.
Notwithstanding their temporal indifference, however, puzzles of
this second sort are ironically apt to afflict only some—albeit most—
proffered accounts of justice that we find typically employed in inter-
temporal contexts.  The reason is that they actually afflict only such
justice conceptions as take distribution-antecedently specifiable maxi-
mizing imperatives to be independently normatively compelling, and
thus analytically “prior” to distributive imperatives.13  For those con-
ceptions accordingly take Paretian criteria to be fit for justice theo-
rizing, and Pareto, we shall see, is what brings all the mainstream work
done on intertemporal justice to grief.14  We will get an inkling of the
troubles simply by looking back to the terms of art figuring into the
questions themselves as I framed them a moment ago—“efficiency,”
“Pareto,” “welfare,” and so forth.  But I shall draw this all out in more
detail below.
11 There are yet more renditions of Pareto, most of them developed quite recently.  See,
e.g., the papers by Basu & Mitra, and Mitra & Basu, discussed infra Part IV.B.
12 It has recently been argued that Paretian criteria entail a strict form of “welfarism,”
according to which worlds can be deemed better or worse only in keeping with the preferences—
even if these be morally arbitrary or indeed immoral or anti-ethical preferences—of individuals.
It has likewise been argued that this form of welfarism is incompatible with justice.  Hence it has
been argued that justice is an offence against “welfare” and “the Pareto Principle” alike.  This is
all nonsense, as shown formally in Robert Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare, SOC. CHOICE & WEL-
FARE (under review 2009), and as argued at length in Hockett, supra note 10. See also Hockett,
Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5.
13 I note elsewhere that one can “translate” any distributive imperative into a maximiza-
tion imperative, and vice versa. See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5.  To
specify a maximization imperative without reference to distribution is thus effectively the same
as to treat maximization as analytically “prior” to distribution.  It is to suggest that one can first
specify a normatively interesting maximandum without any reference to distribution, and then
derive distributive norms therefrom.  This, I argue at length elsewhere and shall note again fur-
ther below, is a form of fetishism. See id.
14 I shall argue that this affords added reason to displace these imperatives from their
currently dominant role in intertemporal justice theorizing.  But there are many more reasons
for such a displacement, which I have offered at length elsewhere and will partly rehearse below.
So here we shall find simply another reason to have done with a mode of justice theorizing that
is already, independently, worthy of the scrap heap.
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Now, I believe that to take maximization imperatives for “prior”
to distributional ones—or, therefore, for being in any way indepen-
dently interesting from a normative point of view—signals a critical
foundational error.15  I accordingly likewise believe it mistaken to
think that Paretian criteria can play any useful role in distributive eth-
ics.16  Hence I believe that those puzzles which these commitments
occasion in respect of intertemporal justice theorizing are merely
symptomatic of deeper errors.  They signal errors, on the part of these
conceptions, about justice simpliciter, not simply errors about
diachronic justice.
A plausible account of distributive ethics, I believe and shall ar-
gue, takes normatively interesting maximization to be merely the flip-
side of antecedently applicable distributive imperatives.  In that sense
it takes maximization imperatives to be ethically otiose.  It accordingly
finds Pareto to be at best parasitic upon, and more often an unjustifi-
able impediment to, independently compelling distributive norms—
norms more directly keyed to what we take ourselves to be and thus
to be entitled to.
I shall say more on this presently, after returning to those ques-
tions raised by our panel’s subtitle.  For, in effect, I have just dropped
a hint as to why that subtitle is so apt: I have said that distributive
norms have to do with what we take ourselves to be—i.e., who “we”
are.
III. The “Grammar” of Distribution: Justice’s “Who,” “What,” and
“How” Questions—And Their Plausible Answers
Now, I think that we situate ourselves to see clearly why one
might say all I have just said, only upon undertaking carefully to ad-
dress questions of the sort I have cheerfully noted our panel’s subtitle
to pose.  For, at that level of abstraction at which we are operating,
justice is always about distribution.17  And “to distribute,” of course, is
a verb—more specifically a transitive verb.  Verbs, for their part, like
15 See Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5.
16 More on why infra Part IV.A. See generally Hockett, supra note 10; Hockett, supra
note 12.  This is scarcely surprising, by the way, when one recalls that Pareto developed his
efficiency criteria, in part, precisely in order to duck politically controversial distributional ques-
tions. See Hockett, supra note 10; Hockett, supra note 12.
17 It is conventional to subdivide justice into distributive, retributive, and nowadays even
“corrective” categories.  What all have in common, however, is the venerable Aristotelian idea
of giving everyone her due.  And “due giving” is simply “just distribution” at the level of abstrac-
tion at which we are here operating. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 110–14
(Martin Oswold trans., 1962) (lines 1129a–1130a).
1144 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1135
other word-forms, always implicate grammar.  In particular, they im-
plicate “case grammar,”18 a species of grammar that I believe theorists
of distributive ethics—of justice—do well to consider with care.
A. “Doing Justice” as a Verb: “To Distribute” Is an Action Word
So what is this “case grammar” to which I obliquely refer?  Case
grammar is the set of relations subsisting among certain “variables”
opened by words like “distribute” and other infinitives—in the pre-
sent context, for example, infinitives such as “to allocate,” “to
spread,” “to mete out,” etc.  We can think of case grammar as the set
of rules governing what means of filling those variables make sense—
as well as, relatedly, how filling one variable in one way might con-
strain ways in which one can plausibly fill other variables.
Now before you begin to think that this all sounds mysterious, let
me note quickly that “variable” in this context is simply the generic
term for sundry grammatical subcategories whose names, I suspect,
will ring more familiar.  For we are speaking, in essence, of “subjects,”
“direct objects,” “indirect objects,” and verb-modifying “adverbs”
here.  Case grammar can accordingly be viewed as the study of what
can fill those roles for particular verbs, as well as how filling one such
variable one way might constrain how one can then fill remaining
variables.
Case grammar is germane to justice theorizing, in my view, pre-
cisely because once we announce that we are aiming to develop a
“theory” of “appropriate distribution”—that is, a theory of justice—
we invite certain questions.  We invite questions concerning who it is
we think are or ought to be distributing; what it is we think is or ought
to be distributed; to whom we think that it ought to be distributed,
pursuant to what pattern or formula, and by what mechanism, we
think that it ought to be distributed, and so forth.  I call these ques-
tions concerning who the “distributors” and “distribuees” are, what
18 Careful study of case grammar appears to originate with Fillmore. See generally Charles
J. Fillmore, Toward a Modern Theory of Case, in MODERN STUDIES IN ENGLISH: READINGS IN
TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 361, 361–75 (David A. Reibel & Sanford A. Schane eds., 1969);
Charles J. Fillmore, The Case for Case, in UNIVERSALS IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 1, 1–88 (Emmon
Bach & Robert T. Harms eds., 1968); STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (C. Fillmore & D.J.
Langendoen eds., 1971).  The analysis of predicates as argument-taking functions appears to
have originated with Frege. See Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen
nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, translated in Begriffsschrift, a Formula Lan-
guage, Modeled Upon That of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought, in FROM FREGE TO GO¨DEL: A
SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1879–1931 1, 5–82 (Jan van Heijenoort ed., 1967);
GOTTLOB FREGE, FUNKTION UND BEGRIFF (1891).  I make fuller use of case grammatical cate-
gories in Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5.
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the “distribuendum” or “distribuenda” is or are, and what the appro-
priate “distribution formula” and “distribution mechanism” are.19
Now unless all of these questions are answerable by one’s puta-
tive account of justice—that is, unless all of the “variables” are filled
by that putative account once it is fully articulated—one will not actu-
ally have specified a theory, as distinguished from a theory-fragment,
at all.  One will not have said anything that can guide actual, distribu-
tive action.  It will be as if one had commanded another, “Go to
the . . ., and then turn to the . . .,” without ever having filled in the
ellipses.  The normative, would-be action-guiding clutch will not yet
have engaged.  Only by filling all case-grammatical “variables,” then,
does one succeed in specifying a determinate account of appropriate
distribution—that is, of justice.
I find it interesting and even surprising, in this connection, how
very few justice theorists or welfare economists actually do get around
to filling the variables.  But what is more interesting, I think, is how
some fillings of variables turn out to be much more plausible—much
more true to our experience of ourselves as acting agents deliberating
even now about justice, as well as to our intuitive judgments of right
and wrong—than others once we explicitly attend to and think about
the matter.  And equally interesting, I find, is how certain fillings of
some variables tend to constrain plausible fillings of other such
variables.
In fact, I have come to think, there is in the end only one plausi-
ble family of extensionally equivalent fillings of the case variables
opened by “to distribute” and cognate infinitives.20  And this family of
fillings, we shall see, altogether avoids what I have above called the
19 For fuller treatment, see Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5.
20 By “extensionally equivalent” in this context, I mean that alternative full sets—“vec-
tors,” in the idiom of linear algebra favored by economists and some justice theorists—of varia-
ble-fillings can dictate identical distributive outcomes “on the ground.”  I can, for example, name
“exogenous opportunity” as the distribuendum, “responsible agents” as the distribuees, and
“distribute equally” as the distribution formula.  I can, alternatively, name “satisfaction” as the
distribuendum, “responsible agents” as the distribuees, and “to each precisely according to her
expense of responsible choice” as the distribution formula.  On certain plausible interpretations
of the words I have used in characterizing them, these two distribuendum/distribuee/distribu-
tion-formula triples recommend identical distributive outcomes “on the ground.”  In this sense,
just distribution can be likened to an isoquant—a sort of “indifference curve” of the sort familiar
to decision theory and related disciplines.  Two justice theories will bear the same distributive
upshot, and in that sense be located on the same “curve,” so long as a difference in specification
of the distribuendum is matched by a “compensating” difference in specification of the distribu-
tion formula.  I think that something like this accounts for the impression one has, upon reading
some sets of justice theorists, that they don’t really disagree as much as their casuistic termino-
logical disputes at the margins might seem to imply. See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5.
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“second” class of puzzles apt to afflict intertemporal justice theorizing.
Let us turn, then, to this matter of filling the variables.  I shall begin
with the “who” questions implicated by justice inquiry, then move to
the others.
B. Those Who Distribute and Those Who Receive: Distributors and
Distribuees
The “who” questions are, not surprisingly, subject to highly con-
testable answers.  That is partly because they can be read in much
more than one way.  So, for example, there is the question of who or
what the “we” and the “our” are to be taken to embrace when we
speak of what “we” owe to those who come later, and what we owe
them through “our” legal system.  And there is the question of who or
what “they” are, to whom “we” and “our” legal system are taken to
owe something in future.
What are the natures or identifying characteristics of these obli-
gors and obligees?  Are we speaking of human persons only, or per-
haps other creatures or things too?  If the latter, must the creatures be
rational, “person-like,” sentient, or something else?  If, say, we mean
humans only, do we mean all human beings, or simply rational ones or
adult ones, or perhaps merely co-citizens, or rational co-citizens, or
human beings as yet further characterized in some other way or ways?
As if that were not variety enough of possible answers in need of
selection, note that in some of these possible cases there is also a
looming question sounding in what lawyers would call possible “joint”
and “several” interpretations of the plural terms “we,” “our,” “they,”
“their,” and so on.  Are we speaking, for example, of obligations that
“we” collectively owe, as some manner of joint agent—e.g., a current
generation, a polity, a group of government functionaries?  Or are we
speaking of obligations that each of us owes individually, as a distinct
agent?  Or is it perhaps both?
How about those to whom the obligations are owed: Joint, as the
term “generation” might be taken to connote, without concern for
particular members of groups?  Or several, since it is often, if not in-
deed typically, individuals within generations or other groupings who
elicit our concern?
Some of you might have found occasion to notice that contro-
versy over how to address the “joint versus several” question, and
then how to individuate individuals under the “several” interpreta-
tion, is particularly acute right now in the “global justice” arena.  So-
called “cosmopolitan” partisans to this controversy, for example, like
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many human rights lawyers, advocates, and activists, hold that obliga-
tions sounding in political and even distributive justice run in favor of
individuals irrespective of political or legal boundaries.21
Others hold so-called “political” or “constructivist” positions
where rights and justice are concerned, pursuant to which obligations
in justice bind persons to one another only in so far as they jointly
participate in a particular form of common political venture.22  The
venture they have in mind is typically a nation state or cognate politi-
cal entity, authorized in some sense to coerce some in the name of
all.23  Some who take such positions are prepared to countenance the
prospect that “the global system” itself might at some point become
such an entity, but few of these folk appear willing to think we are
there yet.24
Finally, some advocates of “group” or “cultural” rights, as well as
some international lawyers, emphasize collectivities of one sort or an-
other as the primary beneficiaries of obligations in justice.  The em-
phasis in such case is less on the person as a rights-bearing individual
identifiable by reference to characteristics held by all persons, than it
is on the person as part of some cultural, linguistic, or political com-
munity, which itself is then taken to be the bearer of rights.25  Some
sophisticated modern theorists, for their part, seek means of recon-
ciling individualist and culturalist accounts of justice.26
Controversy over how to address the “joint versus several” ques-
tion is implicated not only by current disagreement in the global jus-
tice arena.  It also is implicated, I think, more specifically by the
subject of our conference itself.  Consider: If our obligations include
not only that we act in a distributively just manner vis-a`-vis future
21 See, e.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, GLOBAL POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 169 (2002); see also Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5;
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5.
22 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (1999); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of
Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 120 (2005).
23 See RAWLS, supra note 22, at 38–39; Nagel, supra note 22, at 120–21.  Nagel in particular
emphasizes the role of coercive authority exercised in the name of a polity as that which under-
writes obligations in justice between members of that polity.  I don’t see that this can be either
necessary or sufficient, but here is not the place to argue the point.
24 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 22, at 6; Nagel, supra note 22, at 137–38.
25 “Organicist” orientations of this sort were commonplace of nationalist ideologies of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., GEORGE H. SABINE & THOMAS L. THORSON,
A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY (4th ed. 1973).
26 See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1991); WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 7–8
(1995).
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generations in respect of the aggregate of resources we leave them,
but also in respect of the likelihood of a just distribution, inter se,
among them of such resources as ultimately are left to them, then we
might well owe them much more than mere raw materials.  We might
also be under obligation to do the best that we can to ensure we are
leaving to them stable institutional structures apt to work distribu-
tively just synchronic allocations of those materials among them.
Another instance of the problematic nature of the who “they” are
question which is particularly relevant to the topic of our conference is
rooted in, or generalizable from, what Parfit has famously called the
“nonidentity” problem.27  A distinct line of justice thought has it that
obligations in justice run only to particular, determinate individuals.28
The idea is that I can only wrong “you,” or “him,” or “her,” or per-
haps even “it” pursuant to this line of thought, but not merely “some
possible beneficiary.”  One must be able to individuate each benefici-
ary of a justice obligation, that is to say, per this line of thinking.  And
if that is so, then it might seem that our conference itself is without
proper object.  For it will look as though there might be no obligation
to “future” generations or individual beneficiaries.  Why?  Because
these are not determinate, existing particulars.
Indeed, note here that even if we relax the existence constraint by
saying, for example, that justice is owed not simply to existing benefi-
ciaries, but also to all determinate, including future, beneficiaries who
definitely will come to be, there remains at least one problem with
that “determinate” characterization itself.  For, even setting to one
side the possibly problematic commitment to metaphysical determin-
ism that the phrase “beneficiaries who definitely will come to be”
seems to import, it is nevertheless true that what we do now will itself
do some of that “determining” of who or which those future benefi-
ciaries are.
One course of action, for example, will likely result in one set of
people’s (and other creatures’) coming to be.29  Another course of ac-
27 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–55 (1984).
28 The most forceful argument of this sort, in my estimation, is that of Michael Thompson,
What Is It to Wrong Someone: A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES FROM
THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 333, 379–84 (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., 2004).
29 I’ll prescind from nonhuman beneficiaries just for a moment here.  I do happen to be-
lieve that we bear, both individually and collectively, obligations to nonhuman creatures.  The
obligations for their part are of course keyed to the constitutive features and functions of the
creatures in question.  For more on the latter, see Michael Thompson, The Representation of
Life, in VIRTUES AND REASONS: PHILLIPA FOOT AND MORAL THEORY 247 (Rosalind Hur-
sthouse et al. eds., 1995).
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tion will result in another such set’s coming to be.  At least that is so if,
as seems likely, different courses of action taken now will result, for
example, in different people’s coming to couple at differing times
under differing circumstances, hence bringing differing zygotes to-
gether and thus bringing differing offspring into the world.  And if
that is the case, then specific future people—even those who “defi-
nitely” will come to be—cannot anchor or ground any specific present
decisions or obligations to act in one way rather than another.  For the
differing actions will themselves determine who the future people ac-
tually are.
Like remarks by and large carry over to what particular creatures
of other species will come to be.  Take one course of action, and one
group of coyotes inhabits the Northeast United States.  Take another
such course of action, and a different group of coyotes, or perhaps no
coyotes at all, inhabit the Northeast United States.  And so on.
Unless there are obligations to bring some persons, and perhaps
nonhuman beneficiaries too, rather than others into the world, then,
we would seem to be caught in a vicious circle.  It is a circle that seems
to prevent our settling upon any determinate obligation in justice.  At
least that is so if, with Parfit and a few others, we view “nonidentity”
as a “problem” by taking obligations in justice to others to be ineluc-
tably indexed by particular individuals who determinately do or will
exist.
Now, I think that we do bear obligations in justice to beneficiaries
who will inhabit the world later but do not do so right now—including
beneficiaries whom and which we have no means of determinately in-
dividuating right now.  And that means, of course, that I do not actu-
ally view the “nonidentity problem” as a serious problem for justice.
So let me turn to saying a bit more about how I think problems
concerning the distributors and distribuees implicated by questions of
intertemporal justice—justice through time—are best approached and
addressed.  This means that I shall be saying what I think “we” ought
in justice to be doing, through “our” law and policy, on behalf of those
who do not yet live, but indeed shall live in future.  It means, that is to
say, that I aim now to begin answering specifically those very queries
that constitute our panel’s subtitle, as well as to justify my answers.
To begin, then, recall that my approach to justice more generally,
hence to justice in its particular manifestations such as in the intertem-
poral case, is in some ways theoretic, in some ways even what I call
“metatheoretic,” and in some ways pragmatic or “commonsensical.”
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On reflection, I do not think a complete account of justice can avoid
being all three—for reasons I think will emerge as I proceed.
Metatheoretically, then, as mentioned before, I think that justice
is always at bottom about distribution.  It’s about the spread of vari-
ous things over various loci—i.e., various persons to whom, or crea-
tures to which, or places at which, things in some sense “belong” or
“are due.”  Justice is “aptness” or “fittingness,” we might say.  It is
about what tends to befit—or “is due”—beneficiaries, hence what “it
behooves” those who are subject to justice to do.  There’s an obvious
link, in this sense, between justice and beauty, a link corresponding to
that often noticed between ethics—especially “virtue ethics”—and
aesthetics.30
Now in light of such background considerations, it is hardly sur-
prising that justice should bear a structure—a determinate “internal”
arrangement of constitutive elements.  And because justice, as correct
distribution, is something one “does” or we “do,” it is not surprising
that its structure in turn should be mirrored in the grammar of such
verbs as “to distribute,” “to allot,” “to mete out,” “to spread,” and the
like that we noted above.  The cognitive grammar of these infinitives,
which I mentioned before, naturally replicates—and is replicated by—
the structure of justice itself.
Now, how we fill one or more of the case grammatical “vari-
ables,” as I also mentioned before, tends to constrain plausible fillings
of other such variables.  For example, if we view ourselves as distribu-
tors and distribuees—subjects and indirect objects of the infinitive “to
distribute”—alike, as we well might in a democratic polity, then we
will tend to view the recipients of distributions in a particular way: We
will view them as possessed of some capacity—and presumably there-
fore of some responsibility as well—to determine their own well-be-
ing.  For some such presumption would seem to be raised, if not
indeed presupposed, by the fact that “we” take ourselves, after all, in
our presumed role as distributors, as able to act upon—in this case, to
spread—the makings of well-being.
30 There is a large literature on the notion of justice as a form of “symmetry,” which latter
in turn is associated with beauty.  The locus classicus is ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 113
(Martin Oswold trans., 1962).  A stimulating contemporary meditation on the linkages is ELAINE
SCARRY, ON BEAUTY AND BEING JUST 86–93 (1999).  A compelling assimilation of ethics and
aesthetics is found in, among other places, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974) (1921).  As for virtue ethics, the
literature is vast and still growing.  Let me confine myself, then, simply to citing that article from
which the contemporary revival has sprung.  That is G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philoso-
phy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
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This is, in fact, how I tend to view at least most human dis-
tribuees, and how I think others do too.31  I think that as beneficiaries
of distributive ethical obligations—that is, obligations in justice—the
overwhelming majority of those of “us” who are human are what I call
“boundedly responsible agents.”32  We are, on the one hand, largely
responsible for, and thus far appropriately held responsible for, our
own well-being.  For the latter is something we actively make “from
the hand we are dealt.”
We are not, on the other hand, responsible for the mentioned
“hand,” since it is “dealt” us by forces outside of ourselves.  Hence the
“boundedness” portion of my formulation.  Now this “hand,” for its
part, conspicuously includes exogenously given material resources,
some of which are “internal” to our physical bodies, and others of
which simply are “out there” in the world.  The “hand we are dealt”
also of course includes families, polities, and other institutional affilia-
tions into which we are born, and which can influence our life pros-
pects profoundly, particularly during the earlier phases of our lives.
The components of the hands we are dealt tend to be mutually
complementary and indeed reinforcing.  For the resources to which we
bear early access are determined in critical part by socially, politically,
or legally determined entitlements to the use of material and cultural
resources held by those persons who are in turn socially, politically, or
legally charged with our care when we are young or are otherwise
vulnerable.
All of these exogenously given resources, capacities, and institu-
tions, for their part, are, as intimated a moment ago, what constitute
the “boundary” of those I call “boundedly responsible agents.”  Now,
there are of course always “boundary disputes” concerning precisely
where our responsibilities end and our environments kick in.  But this
is precisely because we view the boundary as normatively important.
It is, in other words, precisely because we see justice—what people
are owed—as partly, yet not wholly, riding on what they themselves
choose to do, that we argue over the respective limits of choice and
circumstance.
So I think that justice’s human distribuees are implicitly viewed
by all of us as being the same as its distributors—that is, as “us.”  And
31 There is a growing body of empirical evidence grounding this belief. See generally
Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5.  I
am again sidestepping, for the moment, nonhuman beneficiaries of justice.
32 Again see Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seri-
ously, supra note 5.
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I think that we view ourselves, hence the distributors and the human
distribuees, as boundedly responsible agents in the sense I have just
sketched.
C. What Is Distributed: Distribuenda
Now insofar as we view distribuees as agents who are in part re-
sponsible for their own well-being, in turn, I think we are apt to view
that which should be distributed—the aforementioned distribuendum,
or vector of distribuenda—as the aforementioned “makings” of well-
being.  We will think of distribuenda, that is, as “inputs” to well-being,
which recipients in turn are at least partly responsible for transform-
ing into well-being.
This means, from an operational point of view, that we shall see
justice as more immediately concerned with “inputs” to well-being
than with well-being “outcomes.”  See to it that agents receive the
right materials, in other words, and just outcomes will take care of
themselves.  Or rather, the agents will produce the right outcomes.
Note, however, that I have not yet said enough to afford full con-
fidence that those “right outcomes” will indeed be produced.  Why?
Because I have not filled all of the variables yet.  I have characterized
distributors, distribuees, and distribuenda, but still have said nothing
of distribution formulae or mechanisms—I have not yet adverbially
modified “to distribute.”
On the other hand, as if to corroborate my earlier claim that fil-
lings of some variables some ways tends to constrain plausible fillings
of other variables, note that the specifications I have already given
tend to lead us to a particular view of the appropriate distribution
formula and mechanism: They seem to point us toward what I call an
“opportunity-egalitarian” distribution formula and toward distribu-
tion mechanisms that tend to spread resources accordingly.
D. How It Is Distributed: Patterns and Mechanisms
“How so?” you might ask.  Well, suppose, as seems natural, that
we view our responsible agents as bearing equal moral worth, at least
antecedently to their taking variously commendable or blameworthy
actions for which they might be considered responsible.  Prior to act-
ing, that is to say, you are not ethically better or worse than, and
therefore not ethically entitled to more or to less than, I am; nor am I
better or worse than, or therefore entitled to more or to less than, you
are.  Apart from our particular actions, we are indistinguishable under
the aspect of justice, and so symmetrical treatment means equal treat-
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ment here.  That would be equal treatment of us as agents, hence
equal entitlements to the materials of agency—viz., to material
opportunity.
If all of that is sound, then it would seem to suggest straightaway
what we are to take for the appropriate pattern pursuant to which
well-being inputs should be spread: those ethically exogenous material
inputs should be spread equally over distribuees.  I think that our
shared conception of justice—not simply political justice, but justice—
shows that we are already committed to this view.  We already believe
that opportunity—i.e., inputs, as distinguished from outputs that im-
pound our differential efforts in addition to the inputs—should be
more or less equally spread over agents.  We believe that on the very
same grounds that we take one another for entitled to an equal voice
in collectively deciding together, in a democratic polity whose laws we
have not violated, what collective actions to take.  Those are grounds
of equal opportunity for agents.
Note that this doesn’t mean equality of outcome, at least if by
“outcome” we mean only some restricted portion of the full vector of
“outcome components.”  If you and I are of more or less equal genetic
capacity and begin with more or less equal bundles of equally desired
or useful resources, and then you build a home while I lose a bet on
the stock market, our outcomes will not be unequal in any sense inter-
esting to justice as distinguished from, say, charity.  It would only be
by ignoring the fact that my “outcome” also includes whatever satis-
faction I derived from the gamble that one could hold otherwise.
The opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula, then, counsels
our equalizing inputs, not outputs.  I am of course presupposing that
inputs can be commensurated in saying this, but as I’ll now note, prop-
erly designing our distribution mechanisms affords means of ensuring
that this is done.
In such case we shall likely attempt to design and institute such
distribution mechanisms as foster, not equal well-being or satisfaction
outcomes, so much as equal resource or material opportunity inputs—
leaving outcomes to vary with individuals’ responsible efforts.  Or, put
differently, we shall be apt to deem voluntary leisure itself as among
the justice-relevant outcomes, such that one person’s possessing more
manufactured goods than another does not itself amount to an une-
qual outcome if both parties have in fact begun with equal initial en-
dowments and if differing compositions as among their outcomes are
accordingly traceable to differing preferences and choices.
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Now if, by contrast, we were to view distribuees as not being re-
sponsible for how well they fare, and yet bearing equal ethical worth,
then we might well aim at equalizing satisfaction outcomes.  Hence we
would not be committed to equalizing material inputs if, as seems
likely, differing people are born with differing utility functions, hence
apt to require differing inputs to be brought to the same outcome.
I do not think that the latter view is plausible, nor do I think
anyone else will who thinks about the matter with care.  There are
many considerations that militate in favor of taking distribuees to be
boundedly responsible agents rather than mere patients.  One is that,
in a democratic polity, where distributors and distribuees are ulti-
mately the same, our taking responsibility qua distributors undercuts
any suggestion that distribuees are not in some measure responsible
for their lots.  Doesn’t our taking the trouble to deliberate about jus-
tice and then act upon our conclusions, in other words, itself undercut
any suggestion that we are not partly responsible for our lots?
For this and related reasons, I think that the first view I have
sketched is the correct one.  Other views apart from these two I have
mentioned are of course possible.  But I shall leave the full set of pos-
sible permutations of variable-valuations to one side for now in the
interest of time.
In sum, then, I think distributors and distribuees are most plausi-
bly conceived as boundedly responsible agents, who produce their
own satisfactions out of exogenously given material opportunities or
resources, which accordingly ought to be distributed equally in keep-
ing with our equal moral worth.  Material opportunity, or “resource,”
is of course to be understood broadly on this conception, to include
physical capacities and handicaps, genetic and legal endowments and
inheritances, and so forth.  It corresponds, more or less, to what Arne-
son calls “opportunity for welfare,” Cohen calls “access to advan-
tage,” Dworkin calls “resources,” and Sen calls “capabilities” and
“functionings.”33
Of course this view, like virtually any view, raises familiar mea-
surement and practicability “issues.”  Resources broadly construed in
the manner I have mentioned comprise many distinct kinds, after all.
The relative values of these heterogeneous resources, in turn, in rela-
tion to one another will tend to differ from user to user.  What would
33 See Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 79,
85–86 (1989); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 914 (1989); RON-
ALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 285–86 (2000); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED
39–40 (1992).
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it be, then, as a practical matter, to attempt to “equalize” bundles of
all of them—of “resource stuff”—over individuals, one might ask.
I think that these challenges can be handled rather more readily
than is commonly appreciated, as I work at length to show else-
where.34  Moreover, it is not strictly necessary to show with precision
how this can be done for my present purposes.  For no challenge of
this sort faced by the opportunity-egalitarian take on intertemporal
justice that I advocate here is avoided by any competing such take, as
is readily verified when one stops to consider the fact that “utility”
cannot be distributed directly, but only indirectly through the distribu-
tion of sundry heterogeneous, subjectively valued goods.
I shall accordingly leave these measurement matters mostly to
one side for the present.35  All I shall say right now is this: The mea-
surement problems are actually best handled—I might say “side-
stepped”—by satisfactorily addressing the other, more practical
“how” question: that concerning the appropriate distribution
mechanism.
How can I say that, you might now be asking.  Well, in short form
the answer is this: If I am correct in saying that distributors and dis-
tribuees are best viewed as boundedly responsible agents, and that
what they are owed is an equal distribution of exogenously given ma-
terial opportunity, then it is easy to show that one’s distributively ap-
propriate holdings can be modeled as those that proceed from
exchanges on markets that bear certain attributes.  These markets,
moreover, can be approximated in practice by actual markets consti-
tuted by well-crafted law.  Indeed, I show elsewhere, much of our pre-
sent law is best interpreted as inchoately prompted by aims to create
such markets.36
The attributes in question are two forms of neutrality that I call
“entry” and “process” neutrality, and another attribute that I call
“completeness.”  Entry neutrality is equality in respect of initial re-
source endowments.37  Process neutrality is ongoing equality in re-
34 See, e.g., Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously,
supra note 5.
35 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously,
supra note 5.
36 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously,
supra note 5.
37 “But don’t problems of measurement and commensuration afflict equalization at the
outset just as they might further along?” you might ask.  The question is fair, but is answerable.
The trick is to start with certain core endowments that can be roughly measured and equalized
over persons early on in their lives—before their responsibilities as agents fully kick in.  Those
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spect of bargaining power not traceable to responsible decisions made
by market participants.  Completeness is that attribute whereby all
and only desired exchanges can be made on the market in question.
These attributes, as mentioned, can only be approximated in practice.
But insofar as they are approximated they tend toward producing
what welfare economists will recognize as so-called “equal division
Walrasian equilibria.”38
Such equilibria, for their part, are justice-preserving, in that all
changes in persons’ holdings of goods are traceable to responsible
choices that they have made.  Just as importantly, markets that pro-
duce such equilibria “automatically” do such measuring and commen-
surating as is necessary in respect of heterogeneous goods, in a
manner that justly aggregates differing persons’ differing valuations of
such goods.  And, what is as a practical matter most encouraging, each
step we take in the direction of enhancing the degrees of neutrality
and completeness possessed by our markets, is a step unambiguously
in the direction of greater justice.  How that can be true takes me to
my final set of remarks in connection with how we ought to think
about justice.
E. Interformulability: Of Distribution, Maximization, Equalization,
and Identification
Now, a final metatheoretic observation to make concerning ac-
counts of appropriate distribution, hence justice, is this: There is an
oft-ignored, yet thoroughly systematic analytical linkage among distri-
bution, equalization, what I shall call “identification,” and maximiza-
tion.  And this is so no matter which of these abstract nouns—these
“-tion” words—you tend to concentrate on as your normative “focal
point” when thinking about appropriate law and policy.
Any time we distribute anything over persons, for example, we
equalize one thing among those persons, and we then socially “maxi-
mize,” ipso actu, another thing that is analytically tied to that equal-
include genetic and educational endowments, among others.  Then as exchange behavior com-
mences on markets which we do our best to keep process-neutral and complete, we work regular
estimates of the degrees to which resultant or persistent inequalities can be attributed to respon-
sible choice or to non-responsible disparities. See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 5; Hock-
ett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 5; Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of
Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal
Treatment and Market-Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93, 99 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett,
Three Pillars]; Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
37–38 (2005).
38 See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra note 37, at 100.
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isandum.  Moreover, whatever we thereby equalize corresponds to
some attribute with which we identify each person to whom we thus
distribute.  The importance of this linkage, I think, tends to go over-
looked in the ethics and economics literatures.
Here is an example of what I mean: If we set a goal of socially
maximizing something that we call “utility,” and accordingly “count”
each individual’s “utility function” for one in our aggregative social
utility function—typically in form of a Bergson-Samuelson social wel-
fare function (“SWF”)39—then we shall be treating individuals as
equals in respect of their utility functions.  Precisely this fact is what
underwrites some utilitarians’ (alas, specious) claims to the effect that
utilitarianism is egalitarian by dint of its counting each person’s utility
“only once.”40
What seems to be forgotten by those who advance such claims,
however, is that any social aggregating function that counts each indi-
vidual once in respect of the aggregandum treats individuals as equals
in respect of that aggregandum.  The ethically interesting question is
accordingly whether that aggregandum is the right one.  And the best
way to address that question is first to note that that aggregandum in
respect of which you socially “count” individuals and thus treat them
as equals is, eo ipso, a respect with which you socially identify them—
or, in another idiom, to which you “reduce” them.  Utilitarians, on this
understanding, are readily seen to identify persons with their utility
functions, in effect taking them for something like automatic “utility
cows,” or utility factories, so to speak.
Here is another example: If we view individuals as boundedly re-
sponsible agents as I suggested above—agents who actively produce
satisfaction outputs out of opportunity inputs—then we shall socially
identify them with, and treat them as equals in respect of, this defining
attribute of themselves.  And so we shall endeavor equally to dis-
tribute the aforementioned ethically exogenous material opportunity
over them, and thus “maximize,” socially, something quite distinct
from Benthamite “utility” or preference-satisfaction simpliciter.  In-
39 See infra Part IV; see also Hockett, supra note 12.  I believe that Matt Adler also will be
presenting us with a thorough treatment of SWFs tomorrow, in the first panel of our second
day’s treatment of intertemporal justice. See also MATTHEW D. ADLER, SOCIAL WELFARE,
LIFETIME WELL-BEING, AND EQUITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (forthcoming
2009, manuscript on file with the author); Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Ine-
quality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (2006); Matthew
D. Adler, Well-being, Inequality, and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and Its Policy Implications
(2007) (working paper, on file with the author).
40 See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 830 (1979).
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stead we shall maximize something that might aptly be called “equal-
opportunity-grounded satisfaction.”  That is something quite different
from satisfactions proceeding from background conditions which do
not afford equal opportunity.
Note that, operationally speaking, or mechanism-wise, in this lat-
ter case “we” won’t directly be “maximizing” at all.  “Output” max-
imization will “take care of itself” in this case, through the actions of
individual agents, including ourselves, to whom “we” have but equally
distributed material opportunity inputs.
The systematic interlinkages among maximization, equalization,
and identification, then, affords helpful guidance to those who would
think carefully and completely about distributive ethics, or justice.  It
affords guidance, moreover, quite complementary to that offered by
the “grammar” of “to distribute” and cognate infinitives with which I
have been concerned here.  For it tends to flesh out the full panoply of
claims to which we effectively commit ourselves when we make what
at first might appear to be simply one sensible claim—such as that to
the effect that public policy ought to be concerned with “maximizing
happiness” or some other such thing.
The linkage also tends to lend further weight to a venerable idea
that Doug Kysar here recently has reintroduced to the legal and policy
literature: namely, that “process” is often what nineteenth century
German philosophers might have called “internal” to, or what we
moderns might call “determinative” of, “product.”41  For the means by
which some social aggregate is actually produced would seem to be
decisively constitutive of that product itself.
A social “utility” aggregate on the traditional Benthamite under-
standing just is a sum of utilities that can be maximized without atten-
tion to the question whether people are treated as equals in respect of,
and hence identified with, an attribute of themselves for which they
might not be responsible.  I allude of course to their utility functions,
which, if a matter of innate endorphin endowment, would seem to be
as ethically arbitrary a matter as forehead height or pigmentation.  In-
cidentally, this is, I think, precisely what underwrites the objectiona-
bility highlighted by Nozick’s notorious “utility monster” objection to
utilitarianism.42
41 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 617–18 (2005); see also Hockett,
supra note 12.  Those works trace many implications stemming from justice’s “internality” to—
or “constitutivity” of—welfare itself.
42 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974).
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For precisely such reasons as these, a social satisfaction or welfare
aggregate emergent from an equal material opportunity backdrop, by
contrast, deliberately vindicated and maintained by a society commit-
ted to identifying its citizens as boundedly responsible agents of equal
moral worth, will constitute something other than a Benthamite utility
aggregate.  Its “internal structure”—its “DNA,” so to speak—differs,
and hence so does the aggregate itself.
Now, how do these theoretic and metatheoretic considerations
“apply,” practically speaking, to the matter of intertemporal distribu-
tional ethics, better known as justice?  Well, I think the most impor-
tant upshot of the foregoing discussion for present purposes is the
following: Where true justice is concerned, there is no difference, in re-
spect of core principles, between the diachronic and synchronic cases.
The only real difference between the two cases is epistemic, hence
pragmatic, in character.
If I am right about this, the consequences would seem to be both
very significant and indeed hope-inducing.  For, in effect, we find that
the most vexing problems hitherto affecting intertemporal justice
thinking stem from asking the wrong questions—questions rooted in
an incoherent understanding of distributive ethics.  Let me now ex-
plain why.
IV. How the Right Answers Avoid the Wrong Questions
Note first that, up to the present, by far the greater part of inter-
temporal distributive ethics thinking has been done within two closely
allied traditions.  The first is the utilitarian tradition in ethics, which
carried over into normative economics quite early on as the discipline
first separated off from ethics.43  The second is the theory of economic
growth, a subfield that took off in earnest shortly after the Second
World War.
Now each of these traditions, as it happens, carries within it a
critical tension where diachronic justice is concerned—a tension I
shall show to carry over to the synchronic context as well.  The tension
has found expression in a sequence of startling, but in retrospect
hardly surprising, “impossibility results” of the sort that has been fa-
miliar to economic theory since Arrow’s celebrated result first was
published in 1950.44  And, crucially, these results, like the tension to
43 This tale has been widely told. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 126–37 (1954).
44 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 102–03 (1951).
The work, which grew from Arrow’s doctoral dissertation, was first published in 1950.
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which I allude, afflict only those takes on diachronic justice that are
inattentive to the “grammatical” matters discussed above, and which
in consequence take maximizing imperatives to be independent of dis-
tributive, equalitative, and identificational imperatives.
A. A Tension in the Dominant Tradition of Intertemporal Justice
Theorizing
“What tension?”, you might now be asking.  And “which impossi-
bility results?”  I can best answer these questions by first highlighting
two value commitments at work in the utilitarian and growth-theoretic
traditions to which I have just referred.  For the tension to which I
refer is at bottom a tension between these commitments themselves.
Here then are the two commitments to which I refer: First, owing
to the utilitarian, aggregationist heritage still operative among welfare
economists, there is a tendency among many normatively oriented
economists to take the maximization of something, rather than the
interpersonal distribution of something, as the appropriate normative
focal point.  This tendency has been with utilitarians from the start,
commencing with Bentham, thence extending to Sidgwick on down to
other, more modern utilitarians.45  And of course it has continued in
much mainstream economic thought, including that of Ramsey, Har-
rod, and others who were groundbreakers both in the field of growth
theory and in the economic approach to intertemporal distribution.46
It is also, of course, a tendency at odds with what we noted above in
Part III—namely that all maximization imperatives entail distribu-
tional imperatives and vice versa.
Now, two consequences of the utilitarian and mainstream eco-
nomic focus on aggregation, maximization, and growth are salient for
purposes of diachronic distributional thought.  The first, and simplest,
is that we can immediately expect a puzzle to arise in the intertem-
poral case.  For if generations go on and on, we will move continually
in the direction of an “infinite” utility aggregate quite irrespective of
what we do.  The injunction to “maximize” might in such case appear
superfluous.  Diachronically speaking, utilitarians might thus appear
45 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1932); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (1907); J.J.C. Smart, An Out-
line of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
46 See, e.g., R.F. HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS: SOME RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND THEIR APPLICATION TO POLICY (1948); Frank P. Ramsey, A
Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928).
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to have no raison d’eˆtre.  For the maximization problem might seem
to “take care of itself” where utility streams proceed toward infinity.
As we shall see, however, this puzzle might be sidestepped were it
possible to determine that some indefinitely continuing growth paths
would “strictly dominate” others—i.e., exceed them at every stage.  So
where the proverbial “rub” actually is found is with the second conse-
quence of maximization-speak to which I have just alluded.  On, then,
to that one.
Secondly, then, closely allied with maximization injunctions of
the utilitarian aggregationist sort is attachment to Paretian “effi-
ciency” criteria.47  Now these are of course in obvious potential ten-
sion with distributive ethics insofar as the latter can counsel
redistribution when existing distributions fall short of what is ethically
apt.  The reason is that insofar as one recognizes a Paretian “veto” in
constructing one’s social welfare function,48 her social welfare function
will potentially veto any such distributional norm as can guide distri-
butional action.  For any consistently applied such distributional prin-
ciple can, “in principle,” come to counsel redistribution in some sets of
circumstance.  And that which the Paretian “veto” vetoes is of course
none other than redistribution.49
This, Paretian strain of the utilitarian and mainstream economic
traditions opens immediately into the second puzzle to which I have
alluded.  For now note that also deeply constitutive of the utilitarian
and mainstream economic traditions, at least in the intergenerational
context, is the sensible view that it would be ethically irrational not to
view all generations as equally entitled to utility.  So-called “discount-
ing,” “time preference,” or what used to be called “impatience” in
these traditions, in other words, is sensibly viewed in the traditions as
ethically retrograde.  Sidgwick, Marshall, Pigou, Ramsey, Harrod and
others, all of them have described discounting as reflective of none
but a primitive attachment to the present, a bestial want of imagina-
47 Theorists typically cash out the Pareto criteria in terms of individual preferences.  They
say that one state of the world “dominates” another in a “strongly Paretian” sense when at least
one person prefers the first to the second, with no one preferring the second to the first.  They
say that the first state dominates the second in a “weakly Paretian” sense when everyone prefers
that first state.  Finally, they say that two states of the world are “Pareto indifferent” to one
another when nobody prefers one to the other.  When at least one person prefers one state of
the world, and at least one prefers another such state, the two states are said to be Pareto
noncomparable. See Hockett, supra note 12.
48 See AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21–28 (1970), where
the term “unanimity” is employed. See also AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASURE-
MENT 167–69 (1982) [hereinafter SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT].
49 See Hockett, supra note 12.
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tion, a self-centered favoring of one’s own generation, or some combi-
nation of such atavistic shortcomings as these.50
Curiously, however, the same norm in favor of eschewing ethi-
cally arbitrary distinctions in the diachronic case is not generally ap-
plied by these thinkers to the synchronic case—at least not apart from
the spurious “only once” claim that we noticed above at the end of
Part II, in connection with some utilitarians’ claim to be egalitarian by
dint of counting each individual’s utility function but once.51  In other
words, the matter of appropriate distribution is not treated by these
thinkers as being on all fours with, or independent of, that of appro-
priate aggregation in the synchronic case, notwithstanding its being
treated thus in the diachronic case.
Had it not been for this inconsistency between the synchronic and
diachronic cases, I think, the results that I am about to report might
have been discovered much sooner than they actually were.  For in
that case they could have been derived directly from the same inco-
herence as underwrites the earlier Arrow and other impossibility re-
sults.52  But more of this presently.
Now, as I mentioned, there is an obvious potential tension, when
you think about it, between the intergenerational equity ideal taken
for independently compelling on the one hand, and the unfiltered
transgenerational maximization and Paretian ideals taken for inde-
pendently compelling on the other.  For there is no reason a priori to
suppose that intergenerational equity will be intergenerationally maxi-
mizing of any aggregate understood independently of that which is
equalized.  Nor is there reason to suppose that intergenerational max-
imization of any such aggregate will be intergenerationally equitable.
There would be such coincidence, of course, if one is seeking to
maximize pure subjective “utility” and all generations happen to have
identical aggregated utility functions which are concave—“marginally
diminishing”—in wealth.  But that would be an a posteriori, empirical,
and altogether remarkable truth were it a truth at all.  And so as an a
priori, conceptual matter we should expect troubles to arise in connec-
tion with intergenerational social welfare functions that give indepen-
50 See, e.g., HARROD, supra note 46, at 38–39; ALFRED MARSHALL, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 196–97 (1890); SIDGWICK, supra note 45, at 381–83; ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 28–29 (1920); Ramsey, supra note 46, at 543.
51 See supra note 40.
52 See ARROW, supra note 44.
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dent weight to equity imperatives on the one hand, Paretian
“efficiency” imperatives on the other.53
B. From Tension to Incoherence and Impossibility: Of Koopmans
and Diamond on Down
The tension to which I refer here finally emerged, formally, in a
sequence of striking impossibility results that began to emerge in 1960.
The first was that of Tjalling Koopmans, which soon was sharpened by
a notorious result derived five years later by Peter Diamond.54  In es-
sence, what the Koopmans and Diamond results brought out was that
no intertemporal social welfare function—that is, no SWF aggregating
“infinite utility streams”—could be continuous, Paretian, and what the
authors called “anonymous”—that is, impartial—as between genera-
tions.55  If the SWF is to be continuous and Paretian, in other words, it
must also permit discounting—the favoring of earlier over later gener-
ations.  It must give expression to what Koopmans called “impa-
tience”56—or with what Graciela Chichilnisky, a student of Arrow’s,
later evocatively (and very Arrovianly!) called “dictatorship of the
present.”57  That is of course inconsistent with intergenerational
equity.
Like Arrow’s 1951 result, which initiated the modern study of in-
compatible axiom sets of this sort in the domain of normative eco-
nomic theory,58 the Koopmans and Diamond results quickly became
objects of fascination and dread among welfare economists and
53 Hockett, supra note 12, shows all forms of Pareto to be potentially at odds with any
normative principle of the sort that determines a social welfare function’s argument domain and
aggregation rule.  The results I am about to report can accordingly, along with Arrow’s 1951,
Sen’s 1970, and other notorious impossibility theorems, be viewed as ultimately unsurprising
entailments of that more general impossibility.
54 See Peter C. Diamond, The Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams, 33 ECONOMETRICA
170, 170 (1965); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience, 28
ECONOMETRICA 287, 287–88 (1960).
55 The “infinite utility stream” idea is less intimidating than might first be assumed.  In
essence, the idea is simply that the SWF is to aggregate, not simply the utilities of a finite partic-
ular population, but an ongoing sequence of overlapping generations of utility-experiencing
persons.
56 Koopmans, supra note 54, at 306.
57 See Graciela Chichilnisky, An Axiomatic Approach to Sustainable Development, 13 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 231, 242 (1996).  Chichilnisky’s paper also is interesting in showing that
convergence criteria of the sort commonly employed to avoid the “but isn’t it all infinite?” objec-
tion mentioned above—in particular the widely preferred “long-run average” and “catch-up”
criteria—for their parts imply dictatorship of the future. Id. at 242–43.
58 See, e.g., Peter C. Fishburn, Foundations of Decision Analysis: Along the Way, 35 MGMT.
SCI. 387, 393 (1989).
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growth theorists alike.  Many—again as in the Arrow case—accord-
ingly sought ways around it, while others sought to determine how
robust they might be on weaker axiom sets.59
Among the best known and most interesting of the subsequent
results are the following: In 1980, Lars-Gunnar Svensson generalized
the Diamond result, which had confined itself to the so-called “Sup
Top”—or “supremum topology”—to other topological spaces.60  Dia-
mond’s result, in other words, was not essentially the product of
purely technical assumptions devoid of normatively salient intended
interpretations.
More interesting than the topological generalization was Sven-
sson’s also apparently proving that some ordering of infinite utility
streams, satisfying both Anonymity and Pareto, had to exist.  That was
interesting because it would have seemed to defuse the Koopmans
and Diamond impossibilities, and with them the disturbing apparent
incompatibility between the seemingly independently compelling ide-
als of intertemporal equity and efficiency.
There was a problem, however: The proof was what is known in
mathematics circles as “nonconstructive.”  It constructed what is
known as a “pre-order,” then appealed to a celebrated, if nevertheless
recondite, mathematical result known as “Szpilrajn’s Lemma” to con-
clude that a full ordering “must” exist.61  That is problematic because
Szpilrajn’s Lemma notoriously relies upon the hotly contested Axiom
of Choice, probably the most controversial of set-theoretic assump-
tions ever since its introduction at the turn of the last century.62  In-
59 See, e.g., H. Stuart Burness, On the Role of Separability Assumptions in Determining
Impatience Implications, 44 ECONOMETRICA 67, 77–78 (1976).
60 See Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Equity Among Generations, 48 ECONOMETRICA 1251
(1980).  The sup top is the topology of least upper bounds of all point sets.  It is accordingly
familiar to all who have studied introductory analysis courses in the modern mathematics curric-
ulum. See generally Robert Hockett, Reflective Intensions: Two Foundational Decision-Points in
Mathematics, Law, and Economics, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967 (2008).
61 See Svensson, supra note 60, at 1254–55. An ordering is a relation ≤  among objects
within a defined domain x, x’, x’’, . . . such that (a) for all x, x ≤ x; (b) for any x and x’, if x ≤ x’
and x’ ≤ x, then x = x’; (c) for any x, x’, and x’’, if x ≤ x’ and x’ ≤ x’’, then x ≤ x’’; and (d) for any
two objects x and x’, either x ≤ x’ or x’ ≤ x.  Condition (a) is typically called “reflexivity.”  Condi-
tion (b) is called “antisymmetry.”  Condition (c) is called “transitivity.”  And condition (d) is
called “comparability.”  A preorder is a relation that satisfies only conditions (a) and (c)—re-
flexivity and transitivity.  These definitions are standard, and can be found in most logic and set-
theoretic texts.  They also figure, under varying terminologies, in much of the social choice litera-
ture. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 48, at 2–20.
62 The Axiom of Choice, also known (to followers of Russell and Whitehead) as the “Mul-
tiplicative Axiom,” holds that for any class of classes, there is a function that selects one and only
one member from each of them. See Hockett, supra note 60, at 2037–38.  The link between the
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deed it is common, in view of the Axiom’s contestability, for
mathematicians to note at the outset those of their results that rely
upon it.63  Svensson’s result was accordingly intriguing and seemingly
promising, but it was not enough fully to put aside those worries occa-
sioned by Koopmans’ and Diamond’s results.
A large number of results subsequent to Svensson’s in effect rep-
licated them either in generalizing the Diamond result to other topol-
ogies, in demonstrating the existence of pre-orders and hence
Szpilrajn-warranted orderings, or both.  As a group they accordingly
both demonstrated the robustness of the Diamond and Koopmans di-
lemma on the one hand, while seeming to offer a possible—if contest-
able—way out on the other.  The best known of these results probably
are those by Campbell,64 Lauwers,65 Shinotsuka,66 Fleurbaey &
Michel,67 Asheim & Tungodden,68 and Bossert et al.69  I trust you’ll
thank me for sparing you the details, which I’ll consign here to
footnotes.
The hope raised by these results, to the effect that a full ordering
might be found in light of Svensson’s, Asheim & Tungodden’s, and
Bossert et al.’s proofs to the effect that it “must” exist, was ultimately
to be dashed, however.  For, in a remarkably beautiful paper by Zame
Axiom and Svensson’s result can be seen clearly when one reflects that the Axiom, first stated
explicitly by Zermelo in 1904, is equivalent to Zermelo’s Well-Ordering Theorem, to the effect
that there is a well-ordering for every set—i.e., that every set is well ordered, and each of its
nonempty subsets has a least member. Compare id., with Svensson, supra note 60, at 1254–55.
These propositions are intuitively plausible enough for the finite and denumerably infinite
cases, but are a bit more difficult to make sense of in the nondenumerably infinite case. See
Hockett, supra note 60.  The intuition that underwrites the Axiom of Choice is at work, inciden-
tally, in the “Choice Functions” of which Sen has availed himself in many of his canonical works
of the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT, supra note 48.
63 See Hockett, supra note 60, at 2042.
64 See D.E. Campbell, Impossibility Theorems and Infinite Horizon Planning, 2 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 283 (1985) (generalizing Diamond result to other topologies).
65 Luc Lauwers, Continuity and Equity with Infinite Horizons, 14 SOC. CHOICE & WEL-
FARE 345, 353–54 (1997) (generalizing Diamond result to other topologies).
66 Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Equity, Continuity, and Myopia: A Generalization of Diamond’s
Impossibility Theorem, 15 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 21 (1998) (generalizing Diamond result to
other topologies).
67 Marc Fleurbaey & Phillipe Michel, Intertemporal Equity and Extension of the Ramsey
Criterion, 39 J. MATH. ECON. 777 (2003) (another pre-ordering with Szpilrajn’s Lemma implying
an ordering, a la Svensson).
68 Geir B. Asheim & Bertil Tungodden, Resolving Distributional Conflicts Between Gener-
ations, 24 ECON. THEORY 221 (2004) (like Svensson, constructing a pre-ordering, then relying
upon Szpilrajn’s Lemma to claim existence of an ordering—in this case, a version of leximin).
69 Walter Bossert et al., Ordering Infinite Utility Streams, 135 J. ECON. THEORY 579 (2007)
(as with Asheim & Tungodden, supra note 68).
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published less than a year ago, it is proved that the long sought exten-
sion can never be had.70  Zame’s paper, in other words, is a
nonrepresentablility result, conducted in the idiom of model theory,
showing that we cannot construct or even so much as name any order-
ing extension of Svensson’s pre-orderings.  The result is accordingly of
the same family as those famously derived by Lowenheim and Skolem
in 1915 and 1920, Tarski in the 1930s and 1950s, and Chaitin from the
1960s down to the present.71  It has also been confirmed from another
angle, in effect, by a recent result derived by Luc Lauwers.72
In addition to the results just briefly mentioned, which have gen-
eralized the Diamond and Koopmans impossibility results to topolo-
gies other than the Sup Top, many other results have explored the
robustness of those results both on weaker forms of continuity and on
weaker versions of Pareto.  Many of these results have been derived
by my Cornell colleagues Kaushik Basu and Tapan Mitra.
Probably the best known of these is Basu and Mitra’s classic 2003
result,73 which generalizes the Diamond result to cases involving
weaker continuity requirements, and indeed shows the result to be
independent of any topology chosen.  In other words, they show that
no preference relation meeting the Diamond desiderata of Anonymity
and Pareto, continuous or otherwise, can be represented by a real-
valued welfare function.  In that sense the result anticipates the recent
Zame and Lauwers results just mentioned.  Four years later, in two
70 See William R. Zame, Can Intergenerational Equity Be Operationalized?, 2 THEORETI-
CAL ECON. 187 (2007).
71 See Thoralf Skolem, Logisch-kombinatorische Untersuchungen u¨ber die Erfu¨llbarkeit
oder Beweisbarkeit mathematischer Sa¨tze nebst einem Theoreme u¨ber dichte Mengen, 6 VIDEN-
SKAPSSELSKAPET SKRIFTER, I. MATEMATISK-NATURVIDENSKABELIG KLASSE 1 (1920), translated
in Logico-Combinatorial Investigations on the Satisfiability or Provability of Mathematical Pro-
positions: A Simplified Proof of a Theorem by Loewenheim, in FROM FREGE TO GO¨DEL: A
SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1879–1931, supra note 18.  As suggested in the En-
glish rendering of the title, the Skolem result generalized an earlier one derived by Lowenheim.
See Leopold Lowenheim, U¨ber Mo¨glichkeiten im Relativkalku¨l, 76 MATHEMATISCHE ANNALEN
447, translated in On Possibilities in the Calculus of Relatives, in FROM FREGE TO GO¨DEL, supra
note 18.
The Tarski results to which I allude are A. Tarski, Sur les ensembles de´finissables de nombres
re´els I, 17 FUNDAMENTA MATHEMATICA 210 (1931) and ALFRED TARSKI ET AL., UNDECIDABLE
THEORIES (1953).
Greg Chaitin’s many representation results appear over the course of many books and pa-
pers.  Probably the most often read is GREGORY CHAITIN, THE UNKNOWABLE (1999).
72 See Luc Lauwers, Ordering Infinite Utility Streams: Completeness at the Cost of a Non-
Ramsey Set, available at http://www.eea-esem.com/EEA-ESEM/2007/Prog/viewpaper.asp?pid=
1956.
73 See Kaushik Basu & Tapan Mitra, Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams with Intergenera-
tional Equity: The Impossibility of Being Paretian, 71 ECONOMETRICA 1557 (2003).
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separate papers, Basu and Mitra, then Mitra and Basu, extended the
Diamond result to cases involving weaker new versions of Pareto as
well.  These are novel renditions of their own devising, the details of
which need not detain us here.74
C. Picking up the Pieces: The Correct Conception of Justice Is
Coherent and Compelling Across Space and Time
So where does this leave us?  I believe that it leaves us precisely
where we ought to have expected to arrive all along.  For as suggested
above and as I show formally elsewhere, the hope of reconciling
Pareto, which on the dominant preferentialist understanding is just
anti-normative, with any such preference-incumbent normative princi-
ple as intertemporal equity is misconceived au fond.75  Pareto’s prefer-
74 See Kaushik Basu & Tapan Mitra, Possibility Theorems for Equitably Aggregating Infi-
nite Utility Streams, in, INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY (John E. Roemer &
Kotaro Suzumura eds. 2007).  Their paper (1) weakens Pareto and changes domain restrictions
to find a way out of Diamond result; and (2) tries a “weak dominance” axiom, a “weak Pareto”
axiom, and a “partial Pareto” axiom.  There is some success with the last of these, but the au-
thors note wryly that in reaching that success, they also show further robustness of the original
Diamond result. See id. See generally Tapan Mitra & Kaushik Basu, On the Existence of Pare-
tian Social Welfare Quasi-Orderings for Infinite Utility Streams with Extended Anonymity, in IN-
TERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra (characterizing the class of possible
finite permutations of infinite utility streams consistent with Pareto and social welfare quasi-
orderings).
75 See Hockett, supra note 12.  By a “preference-incumbent normative principle” I mean
simply a normative principle that is incumbent upon—that is, which can trump—preferences.
The idea is that normative principles determine which preferences ought to be satisfied, and
which are to be renounced or repudiated as contrary to our ethical, social, or legal norms.  Any
system of norms or laws, by dint of its bestowal of distributed entitlements upon persons, inher-
ently imports some such “trumping,” hence partitions the class of all possible satisfactions that
an individual might have into distributively legitimate and illegitimate such satisfactions.  In-
tergenerational “anonymity”—impartiality or equity—is of course such a norm.
It might bear noting in this connection that, insofar as norms can trump preferences, there is
a clear category error manifest in such locutions, often encountered in some economic writing, as
“tastes for justice,” “preferences for fairness,” and the like.  Most who engage in such talk are
effectively collapsing normative principles, which are incumbent upon preferences, into prefer-
ences themselves.  Loss of that distinction in turn is to lose the capacity to prescribe or judge
normatively at all.  And the incoherence to which I am attending here stems directly from that
loss. See id.  I shall note here as well that Professor Kysar compellingly describes a counterpart
problem in cost-benefit analysis. See Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution
and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 44 (2006).
In case the distinction between preference on the one hand, and preference-incumbent nor-
mative principle on the other is not immediately clear to you, consider this observation: It is of
course ever possible—and indeed to be hoped—that one will “prefer” to conform his actions to
principles of normative propriety.  But such principles underwrite ethical, legal, and other forms
of prescription only inasmuch as they’re taken for incumbent upon and hence bounding of pref-
erences, not merely as objects of preferences.  George Bush can “prefer” to drive sober and
under 120 mph in our neighborhood, for example, and we all hope that he will, but a legal or
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ence-rooted “veto” always can “veto,” in some possible set of
circumstances, the consistent application of any normative principle
such as intergenerational equity.76
So much for negative results, then.  What about affirmative ones?
Well, here is precisely where I think that the hopeful consequences of
my argument, as promised above, now emerge.  The foregoing obser-
vations, that is to say, should render us encouraged, inspired, and de-
termined to do justice by those yet to come.  There is no reason what
ever to be stultified or paralyzed by those seemingly intractable puz-
zles thought to afflict intertemporal justice theorizing.  For they are all
of them puzzles that fall in what I have called the “analytic” class, and
these we have just seen to be occasioned solely by approaches to eth-
ics and policy that have been incoherent all along.
The correct, opportunity-egalitarian take on distributive ethics
and policy, by contrast, is completely untouched by these troubles.  It
is touched only by those difficulties that I have labeled “epistemic,”
and we deal with difficulties of this sort—which are endemic to tem-
poral life itself—all of the time.
Once we see Paretian criteria, as imposed upon synchronic or
diachronically applied social welfare functions, for what they are, and
indeed once we see all putatively independent maximizing (“effi-
ciency”) imperatives for what they are—namely, as antinormative—
we are immediately freed up to fix our attentions back where the be-
long.  And where is that?  It is on individuals, as the beneficiaries of
distributive ethics and policy.  And it is on individuals as boundedly
responsible agents, in the sense described before, in Part III.
Now, so-called “individualist” and “welfarist” social welfare func-
tions of the sort routinely used and defended by welfare economists of
course register at least inchoate acknowledgment of this fact.  Else why
employ and defend the term “individualist” in describing the forms of
social welfare function they favor?77  But those who employ SWFs of
ethical limit’s being a “limit” is precisely its trumping his preference should he come to “prefer”
otherwise and thus put all of us at risk.
76 On the Paretian “veto,” see supra note 48.
77 “Individualist” SWFs simply are SWFs that take individual utility functions as argu-
ments. See Hockett, supra note 12.  The term appears to originate with Samuelson. See PAUL
ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 223 (1947); see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto
Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281, 281 (2001).  “Welfarism” for its part misleadingly names the
untenable position that SWFs should take “only” such individual utility functions as arguments.
See Hockett, supra note 12; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare:
Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331
(2003); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle,
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this form typically tend to lose sight of the interlinkages among max-
imization, distribution, equalization, and identification noted above in
Part III.  And so they lose sight of the fact that by treating maximiza-
tion norms as if they were analytically independent of or prior to dis-
tributional norms—or indeed even so much as intelligible in isolation
from them—they commit themselves, in effect, to implausible constru-
als of those individuals they purport actually to care about.  They con-
strue individuals, for example, as nothing other than their genetically
acquired utility functions—as “utility cows,” in the sense noted above
in Part III.
But what is an individual as plausibly construed for purposes of
normative theory and policy?  The answer, as seen above, is that she is
an agent—or what I called a boundedly responsible agent.  She is a
being who makes her own welfare, out of material opportunity, sub-
ject to both physical and normative constraints.  She is physically con-
strained in that she only can work with the material hand she is dealt,
including the physical capacities with which she is endowed.  She is
normatively constrained in that some forms of possible satisfaction—
for example, satisfactions derived only by illegitimately taking from
others—will not be normatively or, therefore, socially cognizable as
“welfare” rather than simply as satisfaction—illegitimate satisfaction.
For again, as noted above, our distributive norms are constitutive of—
they are “internal” to—our conception of welfare itself.
Now, if this is correct, what foundational difference can there be
between the synchronic and diachronic cases so far as distributive
normativity is concerned?  The answer is that there is none.  Justice is
just about individuals, whether they live now or in future.  And in par-
ticular, it is about equalizing exogenous material opportunity among
individuals, on a pro rata basis.  What this means from the standpoint
of intertemporal justice is that all of our challenges are just epistemic
in nature.  They are no different in kind from any other decisions we
are regularly called upon to make in respect of a future that is always
inevitably afflicted with some measure of uncertainty.  And the more
distant the future in question, the more afflicted with uncertainty will
be our thoughts about and planning for it.
Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).  The term “welfarism”
would be better replaced by “strict welfarism,” however, or better yet “strict preference-regard,”
since (a) most self-described “welfarists” unpack “welfare” as no more than preference-satisfac-
tion, while (b) it is of course possible to represent social welfare as riding upon one or more
variables additional to individual preference-satisfactions in any event.
1170 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1135
Does that mean that we are to give up engaging in such thinking
and planning?  Of course not.  It means only that we must be humble
and sensible in doing so, acknowledging that we can do no more than
“doing the best that we can, under the circumstances.”  We must be
forthrightly pragmatic, in other words, even while acting, as best we
can tell, in conformity to that which we know to be just.
Now, what would it be to be doing that?  What sorts of considera-
tions ought we to act upon?  Well, this seems a good start to me: We
tell ourselves that each individual apt to come later is apt to be a
boundedly responsible agent just as we ourselves are.  We thus note
that each of them is no more and no less deserving of her equal pro
rata share of ethically exogenous resource—the materials upon which
agents work in pursuing their aims and thus seeking their forms of
satisfaction—than is any of us.  We then turn to considering what that
is likely to mean through time, in light of such knowledge as we are
able to acquire at present—the time in which we are deciding upon
how to act.
What are some bets we might reasonably make, then, in respect
of what things are apt to be like beyond our lifetimes, with a view to
ensuring that people in the future face no less pro rata opportunity
than we do?  Well, for one thing it seems very likely that people in the
future will have much more knowledge than we have.  That is a re-
source—a resource which we shall be not only bequeathing them, but
which to some extent we will be responsible for the very existence of.
Later folk in this sense will “owe” us, rather as we owe our forebears
when it comes to this so-called “knowledge capital.”
On the other hand, it is also quite possible that many other re-
sources that we now enjoy will not be available to our descendants.  It
seems likely that many of these will be quite depleted.  (Petroleum of
course comes to mind, as do coal and other so-called nonrenewables.)
But it also, of course, is in our power to determine the rates of such
cases of depletion, and I suspect even to ensure that this rate does not
exceed the rate at which compensating resources—new knowledge,
new methods, new technologies, perhaps even new interplanetary col-
onies one day—come on line.
It is also not clear, of course, how many more—or less?—people
in future there will be.  And as mentioned earlier in Part II, part of the
unclarity in this case is owing to the fact that it is within our power to
determine how many such there will be—and even, before long, to
determine to some extent what those people (and other creatures) will
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be like.78  Current trends indicate that the globe’s population will con-
tinue to grow rapidly for some years to come.  On the other hand, the
trend also is for that rate of growth to slow, with the likely result that
the world’s population will “level off” at about nine billion within the
coming century.79  And since the trend also is for the material stan-
dard of living to grow and keep growing—as Professor Buchanan of
course will be showing us—it seems that we are likely to be able to
bequeath our descendants lives grounded in at least as much material
opportunity as our own.
We can also, I think, bequeath our descendants a better set of
material opportunities by bettering the spread of our own such oppor-
tunities, right here and now.  We can do so by bequeathing them insti-
tutions that ensure justice is more fully instantiated than it is now—
precisely by building those institutions right now.  There is accordingly
a very real sense in which we shall do better by latercomers by doing
better by one another.  And this is of course hardly surprising.  For
once we take seriously the claim that distributive ethics are about indi-
viduals, and trace that claim’s consequences, we see straightaway that
in speaking of justice we speak of a manner of cross-spatial and cross-
temporal communion.  We speak of a communion of agents, agents
who owe one another as agents.
Note one more consequence of this fact: I speak of individuals as
agents, not of individuals as Tom, Dick, or Mary.  That shows us some-
thing about why I do not think the “nonidentity problem” noted ear-
lier is a problem at all.  I think that we as lawyers, in thinking about
what our legal system owes future generations, should think in the
manner that all the above manifests: We should be thinking in terms
of a very familiar category which perhaps the philosophers would do
well to rediscover—that of non-intentional tort.  We should act, that’s
to say, to avoid creating a “zone of danger” in future into which we
can be more or less reasonably certain that others, whoever they turn
out to be, are apt to stumble.  And for present purposes the “danger”
in question is that of injustice.  It is that of a maldistribution, through
space or through time, of material opportunity.
78 In this connection, see, for example, JONATHAN GLOVER, CHOOSING CHILDREN:
GENES, DISABILITY, AND DESIGN (2006). See also JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE
SHOULD THERE BE? (1984).  This is but the tip of a vast and vexing iceberg.
79 DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD POPULATION IN 2300, at 2
(2004), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/2004worldpop2300
reportfinalc.pdf.
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V. Conclusion
And that’s that.  I hope my remarks have inspired some optimism
in respect of our deliberations ahead.  And I hope they show reason to
move forward from here in a justice-respecting yet pragmatic spirit.
There is every reason to think we will do justice by those who will
follow us, precisely by thinking well about what justice requires right
here and right now.  Analytic puzzles that have plagued intertemporal
justice theory are readily sidestepped by true justice theory.  And epi-
stemic puzzles that plague all future planning are just part of life.
Here as elsewhere we get on with life notwithstanding the future’s
unclarity.  Indeed we provide for that unclarity itself all the time; that
after all is what “planning” is.  We do the best that we can.  As ever,
we muddle through.
Thank you again.  And here’s to the more practical discussions to
come!
